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Abstract—Information leakaged by cryptosistems can be used
by third parties to reveal critical information using Side Channel
Attacks (SCAs). Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a SCA
that uses the power consumption dependence on the processed
data. Designers widely use differential logic styles with constant
power consumption to protect devices against DPA. However,
the right use of such circuits needs a fully symmetric structure
and layout, and to remove any memory effect that could leak
information. In this paper we propose improved low-power gates
that provide excellent results against DPA attacks. Simulation-
based DPA attacks on Sbox9 are used to validate the effectiveness
of the proposals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the security of users private information is a
major concern. Embedded electronic devices usually store
private information, making use of cryptography to ensure data
confidentiality. These cryptocircuits implement mathematically
secure algorithms, but because of their physical implemen-
tation, they leak information (power, timing, EMI, etc) that
could be used by third parties to reveal private data, through
side-channel attacks (SCAs). Thus, cryptocircuits have to be
designed carefully to avoid private information leakage.
Among known SCAs, DPA (Differential Power Analysis)
[1], makes use of the dependence of power consumption in the
processed data by the cryptographic device during encryption
to reveal the secret key. Due to the effectiveness of these
attacks, it has been largely studied the implementation of
cryptographic circuits resistant to DPA attacks [2],[3].
Many countermeasures have been proposed to deal with
DPA attacks, globally categorized as masking and hiding tech-
niques. The best results are achieved with hiding techniques,
based on the implementation of a logic circuit whose power
consumption was independent of the processed data, as it is
provided in [2],[3]. Among them, full-custom solutions based
on differential structures are very well considered [3],[4].
DPL (Dual-Precharge Logic) styles comprise a differential
pull-down network (DPDN) to perform the logic function and
a differential pull-up network (DPUN) to provide the true
and complemented outputs in precharge and evaluation phases.
To be used in secure applications, besides fully symmetry, it
should be ensured that a fixed amount of charge is used in
every transition. Sense-Amplifier Based Logic (SABL [3]) is
a differential logic style that brings into play exactly the same
charge, if new optimization procedures are used [4].
This work faces the optimized design of both DPUN
and DPDN blocks, necessary to fulfill demanding security
requirements. It is shown how commonly used differential
logic gates can be enhaced for cryptographic applications. To
achieve this objective, two methodologies are used together:
one to improve the security in the DPDN [4] and other to
achieve a low-power solution for the DPUN [5]. Making use of
both methodologies, the performance of the differential logic
gate is enhaced, achieving greater security against DPA attacks
and reducing the power consumption and delay of the cell.
The main contributions of this paper are: i) the optimization
of the DPDN [4] to remove stored charge in internal nodes,
trying to avoid harmful memory effects, ii) the spreading of
DPA resistant feature to simpler DPUN [5], and iii) simulation-
based DPA attacks to Sboxes (Substitution boxes) implemented
with different proposals of Xor/Xnor and And/Nand gates, to
assess the improvement of our proposals.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II
includes the previous work related to the used methodology.
Section III presents the optimization procedures proposed in
this work. Section IV includes simulation-DPA attack results
to assess the proposals. Finally, in Section V the conclusions
are given.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
To be used in secure applications, DPUN in DPL cells uses
a dual-rail (differential) logic style, dinamically alternating
evaluation and precharge phases. Therefore, the gate switches
once in every clock cycle, so the switching activity is always
the same. Even using a suited logic style in the DPUN, the
DPDN must be fully symmetrical, regardless of the input
values. Here, symmetry means that all the paths from outputs
to ground must have the same transistor count and the same
equivalent resistance and capacitance in every node. Then the
gate will operate with a constant delay (RC value), regardless
of the specific input values. In the same way, for every input
condition, the charge stored in the internal nodes should be
the same. However, it does not happen in classical DPDN,
where the difference on the power consumption due to previous
computed values, can be used by attackers. This effect can
be strongly reduced using the configuration proposed in [4],
where two methods are presented to remove the memory-
effect on the internal nodes: the double-switch solution and
the single-switch solution. So, in this work we use the three
different DPDN shown in [4]: the classic, double-switch and
single-switch solutions.
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Fig. 1. DPUN and DPDN combinations: a) classic, b) double-switch solution, and c) single-switch solution.
As the gate needs fully balanced differential output nodes,
the DPUN has to be also carefully designed. There exists
several differential logic DPUN families in the literature, but
only some of them are suited for DPA resistance. A DPUN
technique that offers well-known high DPA-resistance is the
SABL [3] gate. The specific features that make SABL resistant
to DPA are i) the presence of the clocked bottom transistor,
ii) full symmetry and iii) outputs of DPDN not connected
to the gate of output inverters. For this work, SABL will be
considered as the reference gate.
III. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATIONS
This section discusses the combination of optimized DPDN
with simpler DPUN, as shown in Fig. 1, to get low-power
and secure DPL implementations, in such a way the SABL
solution could be overtaken either in performances or in
security. For this purpose, after the characterization of several
differential structures, we have selected the DPUN structure
called Dynamic Differential Cascode Voltage Switch Logic
(DDCVSL) [5], because of its relative simplicity.
The main a priori problem of DDCVSL for DPA-resistant
applications, is the direct connection between the output capac-
itances in nodes connecting the DPDN and the DPDN branches
making the structure poorly resistant to DPA. Fig. 2a) shows
the simulated waveforms of a Xor/Xnor gate with classic
DPDN using a DDCVSL DPUN in a 90 nm technology. As it
can be seen, at t=60ns the internal nodes change in opposite
way due to the change of the input B compared with its
value in the previous evaluation. That will lead to a significant
difference in power consumption. This memory effect can be
skipped if we use the proposed DPDN with double-switch
solution, then improving the security of the Xor/Xnor gate,
as it is shown in Fig. 2b).
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed method-
ologies to improve the DPUN and DPDN, the following pro-
posals are generated mixing both methodologies for And/Nand
and Xor/Xnor gates: SABL Classic (DPUN SABL with classic
DPDN), SABL 2P (SABL DPUN with the double-switch
solution for DPDN), SABL P (SABL DPUN with the single-
switch solution for DPDN), DDCVSL Classic (DPUN DD-
CVSL with classic DPDN), DDCVSL 2P (DPUN DDCVSL
with the double-switch solution for DPDN) and DDCVSL P
(DPUN DDCVSL with the single-switch solution for DPDN).
All the proposed gates have been implemented in CA-
DENCE using a TSMC 90nm technology. They have been
simulated with SPECTRE under nominal conditions. Inputs
and outputs of the gate under test are coming/going from/to
gates of the same style, being the clock frequency 100MHz.
Input patterns are such that all possible combinations take
place, then measuring the power consumption for all possible
transitions.We measure the minimum energy value (Min), the
maximum energy value (Max), the mean energy (µ) and
the standard deviation (σ) for all the transitions, in order to
quantify the DPA-resistance of the cell. The energy per cicle
has been computed as shown in equation (1).
E = VDD ∗ TCLK ∗ 1
TCLK
∫ TCLK/2
−TCLK/2
iDD(t) dt (1)
From these values, we obtain the Normalized Energy
Deviation (NED) and Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD),
according to eq. (2) and eq. (3), respectivelly, usually con-
ceived as an indirect measurement of DPA resistance.
NED = (Max−Min)/Max (2)
NSD = σ/µ (3)
TABLE I. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE AND/NAND AND XOR/XNOR GATES.
Evaluation Precharge Eavg Total Delay Transistors
NED NSD Eavg (fJ) NED NSD Eavg (fJ) (fJ) (ps)
And/Nand
SABL Classic [3] 4.25e-3 1.23e-3 8.44 5.86e-3 1.37e-3 12.24 20.68 208 18
SABL (2P) 10.93e-3 2.62e-3 8.22 3.80e-3 1.00e-3 16.08 24.30 246 20
SABL (P) 2.85e-3 6.64e-4 8.57 5.85e-3 1.52e-3 12.72 21.29 219 19
DDCVSL Classic 168.61e-3 29.65e-3 4.78 223.06e-3 68.18e-3 7.84 12.62 89 15
DDCVSL (2P) 287.24e-3 80.23e-3 4.38 241.02e-3 90.61e-3 11.39 15.77 154 17
DDCVSL (P) 147.49e-3 25.23e-3 4.88 245.55e-3 77.81e-3 8.17 13.06 108 16
Xor/Xnor
SABL Classic [3] 3.47e-3 1.54e-3 12.00 2.14e-3 5.13e-4 21.72 33.72 173 18
SABL (2P) 1.08e-4 2.36e-5 12.24 1.51e-3 3.88e-4 30.96 43.20 198 20
SABL (P) 2.65e-3 1.20e-3 12.12 2.11e-3 6.32e-4 22.20 34.32 176 19
DDCVSL Classic 210.13e-3 115.81e-3 7.72 8.05e-3 2.31e-3 14.28 22.00 125 15
DDCVSL (2P) 1.41e-3 3.67e-4 6.13 4.54e-3 1.30e-3 19.92 26.05 142 17
DDCVSL (P) 10.61e-3 1.94e-3 8.03 8.29e-3 2.61e-3 14.04 22.07 126 16
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Fig. 2. Waveform displays and internal (n1 and n2) simulated for the
DDCVSL Xor/Xnor gate: a) with the classic DPDN and b) with the double-
switch solution DPDN.
In Table I, the NED, NSD, power consumption for both
the precharge and evaluation phases, then the total power
consumption, the delay and the number of transistors for each
gate are included. In order to quantify the DPA-resistance of
the cells, the values of NED and NSD of the evaluation phase
are considered, since power consumption in the evaluation
phase has a greater dependence on the processed data (in the
precharge phase, nodes n1 and n2 are floating). In view of
the results reported in Table I, we can conclude that the best
choice for the And/Nand gate is the combination of the SABL
DPUN with the single-switch modification in the DPDN,
and in the case of the Xor/Xnor gate we can choose two
different gates: the SABL 2P with the best security results, and
the DDCVSL 2P low-power solution with enhanced security
over the SABL classical one, and a great improvement in
power consumption and delay over the SABL classic and the
enhanced SABL 2P.
IV. SIMULATION-BASED DPA ATTACK
The values of NED and NSD are only an estimation of
the robustness of the differential gates. A definitive way to
measure the security of the gates is to develop a DPA attack
on a cryptographic circuit incorporating both the referenced
and proposed gates. The cryptocircuit selected for the at-
tack is the 9-bit Substitution box, henceforth called Sbox9,
of the Kasumi algorithm [6], implemented with 84 2-input
And/Nand gates and 95 2-input Xor/Xnor gates. Four different
designs of the Sbox9 are implemented: the Sbox9 CMOS
with classic CMOS gates, the Sbox9 SABL Classic, the
Sbox9 SABL proposal implemented with And/Nand SABL P
and Xor/Xnor SABL 2P, and the Sbox9 DDCVSL Proposal
with And/Nand SABL P and Xor/Xnor DDCVSL 2P. All
the designs of Sbox9 have been implemented in CADENCE
using a TSMC 90nm (Vdd=1.2V) technology. They have been
simulated with SPECTRE under nominal conditions, being the
clock frequency 500MHz and capturing data every 10ps.
The performed DPA attack is based in the steps proposed
in [4]. To compare the robustness of the implemented Sboxes,
the MTD (Measurements To Disclosure) metric is used, be-
ing MTD the minimum number of power traces needed to
retrieve the correct key. In the first round applying the same
1250 input patterns, we obtain a successful attack for the
Sbox9 CMOS and Sbox9 SABL Classic, being the MTD for
the Sbox9 CMOS 145 and 344 for the Sbox9 SABL Classic,
as shown in Fig. 3a) and 3b). In the case of the proposals the
key is not recovered. Another attack is performed in the case
of the Sbox9 SABL Proposal and Sbox9 DDCVSL Proposal
with 10000 input patterns. Again, the attacks are unsuccessful,
being the 10000 input patterns not enough to retrieve the key,
as illustrsated in Fig. 4a) and 4b).
In view of the results, the proposed And/Nand and
Xor/Xnor gates improve the robustness of the implemented
a)
b)
Fig. 3. Correlation coefficients vs trace number (1250 input patterns): a)
Sbox9 CMOS and b) Sbox9 SABL Classic.
a)
b)
Fig. 4. Correlation coefficients vs trace number (10000 input patterns): a)
Sbox9 SABL Proposal and b) Sbox9 DDCVSL Proposal.
gates. In both proposed Sbox9, the MTD is >>10000, im-
proving at least x29.07 the robustness of the circuit. As both
Sbox9 proposals use the same And/Nand gate, it can be
said that improvement of both proposed Xor/Xnor gates is in
the same order, thus, the best choice for the Xor/Xnor gate
is the Xor/Xnor DDCVSL 2P because of its improvement
in security, power consumption and delay over the classic
Xor/Xnor SABL gate and the Xor/Xnor SABL 2P.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the design of DPL gates for
cryptographic applications using two combined optimized
methodologies for DPDN and DPUN. The improvement factor
of each proposed gate over the classical And/Nand SABL
Classic and Xor/Xnor SABL Classic in every case is shown
in Table II.
TABLE II. SIMULATION IMPROVEMENT FACTORS OF SINGLE GATES
OVER THE REFERENCE ONES.
Evaluation Eavg Delay
NED NSD
And/Nand SABL (P) x0.67 x0.54 x1.03 x1.05
Xor/Xnor
SABL (2P) x0.03 x0.02 x1.28 x1.14
DDCVSL (2P) x0.41 x0.24 x0.77 x0.82
After selecting the best gates for power and security,
simulation-based DPA attacks have been made to assess the
security against DPA attacks. The DPA attack results show that
the proposed Sbox9 SABL Proposal and the Sbox9 DDCVSL
Proposal improve the robustness of the circuit in a factor at
least of x29.07 after 10000 input patterns DPA attack over the
reference circuit Sbox9 SABL Classic. Due to the fact that
the improvement on security is comparable in both proposed
Sbox9, it can be said that the Xor/Xnor DDCVSL 2P is a
better choice than the Xor/Xnor SABL 2P, because for the
same security level the Xor/Xnor DDCVSL 2P has less power
consumption (x0.60), delay (x0.72) and area (3 transistor less
per gate).
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